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Abstract 
Taking the cue from the controversial speech of Pope Benedict XVI at the University of Re-
gensburg in 2006, this paper explores the connection between the apparently divergent posi-
tions taken by the Catholic Church and the European secular establishment on the question of 
European identity and Islam. The argument is advanced that the proceduralism of the Europe-
an secular establishment contributes to breed its nemesis, a conservative politicised church, 
but also converges with it in identifying Islam as ‘the Other.’ It is thus asked whether a criti-
cal valorisation of Europe’s emotional attachments may not actually strengthen its capacity to 
embrace the ‘difference’ represented by Islam. 
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 2 
A public sphere formally devoid of all nonsecular sources of moral and ethical 
judgement is quite defenceless against substantive ethical claims; it has only 
proceduralism to fall back on, and thus cannot deliver compelling judgements 
about, or even interpret the meanings of, a polity’s thorniest ethical or political 
dilemmas. Once nation-state sovereignty itself begins to fray […] public dis-
course becomes more vulnerable to subnational or transnational identity claims 
(ethnic, racial, sexual, religious) […] [and] a range of social movements fill the 
public sphere with noisy demands and complaints, including reactionary, anti-
modernist ones. The commitment of liberalism to a public sphere uncontami-
nated by non-liberal moral discourses, whether explicitly religious or not, par-
adoxically makes it vulnerable […] to the claims of fundamentalist or essen-
tialist identity-based social movements.
1
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
What kind of political reading can be made of Pope Benedict XVI’s address at the University 
of Regensburg in September 2006 which led to widespread protests in the Muslim world? 
This broad question is taken as the starting point of a specific line of inquiry that considers 
Benedict’s remarks on Islam and Europe not simply as the expression of a theological per-
spective, but of a political void created by Europe’s nominal proceduralism in relation to the 
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question of European identity. The term ‘Europe,’ in this case, designates not just a set of in-
stitutions, ranging from the European Union to other political actors at national and suprana-
tional level, but a social imaginary, a system of meanings and expectations
2
 that “underpin[s] 
the creation and reproduction of [these] institutions and the organization of solidarity.”3 It is 
contended that the social imaginary of Europe on the vast set of issues related to the question 
of European identity has been primarily shaped by a nominal proceduralism: a political ap-
proach that promotes a system of communal allegiances based on the acceptance of and com-
pliance with universally shared principles. This approach can be observed in relation to the 
politics of enlargement, with membership granted upon fulfilment of the acquis communau-
taire, as well as in the debate on Islam in Europe, with integration mostly conceived as Mus-
lim acquiescence with the norms of European secularity.
4
  
European proceduralism is the attempt to overcome a painful past of religious and na-
tional sectarianism and can thus be described, following Etienne Balibar, as the endeavour to 
shape “a new society, and a new civilizational pattern […] by rearranging the elements inher-
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ited from the very institutions it has to overcome,” particularly the nation-state.5 However, 
two issues cloud the capacity of proceduralism to keep its promise. Firstly, a procedural Eu-
rope, “formally devoid of all nonsecular sources of moral and ethical judgment,”6 appears un-
able to come to the rescue of nation-states placed in a “defensive position” by a globalisation 
which restricts “their ability to mediate social conflicts and leav[es] them without a solution to 
the urgent problem of the constitution of a new ‘citizenship’ in Europe.”7 The risk is that en-
visaged by Wendy Brown in the opening quote of this article. A European proceduralism un-
willing and unequipped to address the political knot of European identity, fearful that this 
may bring further elements of divisiveness in the already trembling European project, may 
have the paradoxical result of favouring the emergence of those reactionary forces that the 
very commitment to procedural (liberal and secular) principles would want to keep at bay. It 
is important thus to discuss how the election in 2005 of the ‘doctrinaire’ Benedict XVI after 
the ‘pastoral’ John Paul II may represent one expression of such reactionary forces and an in-
dication of the growing political deficiencies of proceduralism in shaping a European polity 
which may overcome sectarianisms. Proceduralism, it will be argued, does not displace, but 
simply relocate them. 
There is then another important limit of proceduralism that needs to be taken into ac-
count. Proceduralism as part of the European social imaginary is also a means to “suture a 
dislocation”8 between a present of solidarity and a past of divisiveness. Proceduralism, there-
fore, fosters a horizon of meanings that tends to fold on itself, favouring a selective reading of 
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the past. According to Danièle Hervieu-Léger, selective memory should not necessarily be re-
sented as it contributes to the symbolic production of norms and values which make for a 
shared worldview.
9
 The risk, however, is that of institutionalising a self-absolving narrative 
whereby Europe, in its politics of identity and difference, appears to have definitively trans-
cended the elements of ethnicity, nationality, or religion which made its past so violent. Pro-
ceduralism, in fact, makes the politics of identity/difference merely a question of compliance 
with the universal principles of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. However, it 
will be shown that the proceduralism of Europe has often been only nominal and therefore, in 
key moments of the definition of the idea of Europe, elements of kinship based on alleged 
civilisational or religious ties have been privileged over universalist narratives. 
Taken together, these two arguments suggest that the nominal proceduralism of Eu-
rope is not only politically counterproductive as it favours the re-emergence of reactionary 
forces, such as that of sectors of the Catholic establishment that, with Benedict XVI, pro-
pound an essentialist understanding of Europe revolving around Christianity which stigmatis-
es Islam as ‘the Other.’ European nominal proceduralism is also ambiguous because while 
practicing a communitarian politics of demarcation between members and strangers, it vindi-
cates a universally rule-based politics that places the burden of exclusion automatically on the 
excluded. This externalisation of responsibility has been an important dimension of the nu-
merous public disputes on Islam in Europe, with Muslims accused of failing to comply with 
the rules of secularity and little reflection on the role that Europe may have had in fostering 
those tensions. A strange spectre seems thus to haunt the land of Europe: that of a nominal 
proceduralism that breeds its nemesis, a conservative politicised church, but converges with it 
in identifying Islam as ‘the Other.’   
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2. Political Church 
 
Pope Benedict XVI’s address at the University of Regensburg on 12 September 2006 has 
been one of the most recent European controversies about Islam. The spark which led a num-
ber of Muslims all over the world, including religious leaders, intellectuals, and politicians, to 
voice their indignation at Joseph Ratzinger’s words was his decision to quote a Byzantine 
emperor who argued that Islam has spread its word mostly through violence. The pope was 
discussing the necessity of establishing an alliance between faith and reason and, to argue his 
case, he contrasted the mainstream Christian image of God as shaped by Greek philosophy—
in which an immanent understanding of the good sustained by the strength of reason provides 
the measure of God’s will—against the Islamic image of God as understood by Ibn Hazm—a 
God whose will takes priority over any possible account of the good. In this case, Ratzinger 
suggested, reason and faith are separated and “God’s transcendence and otherness are so ex-
alted that our reason, our sense of the true and good, are no longer an authentic mirror of 
God.” The result is that the believer is at the mercy of “a capricious god […] not even bound 
to truth and goodness” and thus more prone to commit acts of unreasonable violence.10 
That the pope was referring to Islamic terrorism seems uncontentious, less so is 
whether he considered the Islam of Ibn Hazm representative of mainstream Islam. In this case 
Islamic terrorism would appear not just a deviation, but a structural component of an irration-
al religion. Some critics believe this is what Benedict was hinting at: that “because Islam 
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commits itself entirely to faith rather than synthesizing faith with reason, it is a fanatical ra-
ther than a rational religion”11 and therefore inferior to Christianity.12 
Some scholars, however, have claimed that the pope did not mean to offend Muslims 
since his speech was not about Islam but the relationship between faith and reason
13
 and, as 
such, it also contained a condemnation of those strands of Christian thought that have disre-
garded the role of reason.
14
 Interestingly, though, others have asked why, if that was the aim, 
did the pope not mention events such as the crusades or the inquisition in which Christianity 
held violent, overpowering and ‘irrational’ behaviours.15  
Although interesting, the light these remarks shed on the political dimension of Bene-
dict’s address is too narrow because their concern and perspective is mainly theological as is 
most of the (limited) academic literature that has been produced on this event.
16
 The lack of 
scholarly attention to the political dimensions of Ratzinger’s speech can be probably ex-
plained by the widespread secular attitude that characterises (western) social science, which 
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leads to conceive religion almost exclusively “as a system of meaning (supported by symbols 
and rituals) concerning ultimate goals” and thus to approach it “largely from a symbolic or 
culturological point of view.”17 From this perspective, even if a latent political content in the 
Regensburg address is identified, it is considered free of any specific political implication. 
However, a perspective on religion that “invites to separate it conceptually from the domain 
of power”18 makes us blind to how religion is usually embedded in a religious regime, “a 
formalized and institutionalized constellation of human interdependencies […] legitimized by 
religious ideas and propagated by religious specialists.”19 As Mart Bax points out, a religious 
regime is also a political constellation which plays “an important role in processes of state 
formation and state-development” and whose meanings and powers are interrelated and de-
pendent not just on theological argumentations and internal negotiations, but on dynamic rela-
tions with the worldly regime and with other religious regimes.
20
 This is all the more the case 
for the Catholic Church that with its hierarchical structure, global presence, and universal vo-
cation has long been theorised a transnational actor.
21
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Hence, in the case of the Regensburg address, we observe how the religious regime of 
Catholicism as embodied by its leader, Benedict XVI, tries to mould the future development 
of Europe, a polity in the making, by questioning another religious regime, Islam, in a histori-
cal juncture characterised by intense debates in the worldly regime about European identity 
(particularly following the last waves of enlargement and the failure of the Constitutional 
Treaty) and about the capacity of Islam to be part of Europe. The political dimension of Ben-
edict’s address is underlined by its timing—a few months after the publication of the ‘Danish 
Cartoons,’ various national controversies concerning the Islamic veil, and unfriendly declara-
tions about Islam by some European leaders, hence in an already strained context of relations 
between non-Muslims and Muslims.
22
 However, more importantly, its political dimension is 
visible in the speech’s content. The strict line of demarcation Benedict sets between Christian-
ity and Islam, in fact, is not purely theological. In arguing, right after his remarks on Ibn 
Hazm, that the “inner rapprochement between Biblical faith and Greek philosophical inquiry” 
that characterises Christianity together with its Roman heritage “took on its historical decisive 
character in Europe […] created Europe and remains the foundation of what can rightly be 
called Europe,”23 the pope is affirming an identity, a transubstantial compenetration between 
Christianity and Europe that leaves no room for including Islam in the political and civilisa-
tional space of the latter.  
Although Ratzinger’s address is part of Catholic tradition that “since the Middle Ages 
[…] has conceived Europe organically as a Christian civilisation whose unity subsists in the 
                                                 
22
 On the timing of the address see Ana Belen Soage, “The Muslim Reaction to Pope Benedict XVI's Regensburg 
Address,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 8/1 (2007), 137–143. 
23
 Benedict XVI, “Lecture” (emphasis mine). 
 10 
Church itself” and has strongly supported European integration since its inception,24 it is the 
first time, at least since World War II, that a pope feels the necessity of remarking the non-
European nature of Islam—the obligation, in other words, of specifying not just what ac-
counts for Europe, i.e. Christianity, but also what is alien to Europe, i.e. Islam.
25
 To account 
for this situation it is not enough to appeal to a different theological perspective: theological 
considerations, as Mart Bax suggests, need to be complemented with an exploration of the in-
teractions between the religious regime and the worldly regime and, if necessary, also other 
religious regimes. To undertake this task, a very useful framework is offered by Bryan Hehir 
who, in his analysis of Vatican diplomacy towards Europe from World War II, identifies three 
distinct eras.
26
  
The first era is that of the pontificate of Pius XII (1939–1958) who, on the one hand, 
contributed to strengthen the social basis of the Christian Democratic movements in Western 
Europe, and on the other practiced a politics of intransigent opposition and absolutely no col-
laboration between the church and the communist regimes, which he deemed totally illegiti-
mate.
27
 According to Hehir this politics of opposition, including the “rejection […] of the very 
prospect of dealing with communism or with communist states, complemented much of allied 
policy during the Cold War era.” Pope Paul VI (1963–1978) shaped the second era of Vatican 
politics towards Europe with an important change. He abandoned the rigid logic of confronta-
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tion and, very much in line with the European worldly regime, propounded “a Vatican’s ver-
sion of Ostpolitik.”28 The argument was that the Catholic Church “had to accept responsibility 
of ‘saving what could be saved’ within these very circumstances” and thus dialogue had to be 
restored in order to preserve the crumbling network of local churches in the communist bloc 
and in the name of a joint responsibility of East and West towards the sufferings of the 
South.
29
 If Paul VI’s approach entailed an acceptance of communism as an inescapable di-
mension of Europe, one with which it was necessary to find forms of cohabitation, this view 
was radically challenged under John Paul II (1978–2005), Hehir’s third stage.  
The Polish pope put at the centre of his pontificate a double commitment: bringing 
“Europe back into the center of the Church’s concern”30 and strengthening the transnational 
role of the Catholic Church in “international conflict and in issues dealing with world 
peace.”31 As for the previous popes, the politics of John Paul II was greatly influenced by the 
interaction with the worldly regime. However, unlike Pious XII and Paul VI who somehow 
adjusted their positions to the dictates of secular politics, John Paul II also exercised a proac-
tive role in fostering political change. Tirelessly campaigning against the logic of the blocs, he 
acted as the “first citizen of the emerging global civil society”32 when appealing directly to the 
masses in Poland and other Eastern European countries, gathering huge crowds and summon-
ing them on human rights and religious freedom.
33
 Yet, John Paul II appealed also to the secu-
lar regime “as early as in 1988” when, in a famous address at the European Parliament, “he 
called for Eastern enlargement so that the whole continent might again ‘breathe with both 
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lungs.’”34 Although determined to pursue a re-evangelisation of Europe and vocal in calling 
for a recovery of the European “Christian memory and heritage,” a patrimony that he believed 
had been squandered “in an atmosphere poisoned by secularism and dominated by consumer-
ism,”35 John Paul II was also very careful in not making the Christian identity of Europe as 
source of exclusion and divisiveness.  
Having experienced the end of the Iron Curtain but also the disillusionment that fol-
lowed with the spread of ethnic and national conflicts, Karol Wojtyla was particularly con-
cerned with the possibility of a ‘clash of civilisation’36 and thus considered it his particular 
duty to strive to dismantle boundaries between faiths and peoples.
37
 Ecumenism and interreli-
gious dialogue were important dimensions of his pastoral view and led him to a number of 
unprecedented initiatives. He was in fact the first pope to visit a mosque and the only one to 
date to have kissed a Qur’an; he fasted during the last Friday of Ramadan in 2001, received 
the Hindu forehead mark during a sojourn in India, issued an unprecedented heartfelt apology 
for the sins committed by the Catholic Church, from the crusades to anti-Semitism, and invit-
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ed religious leaders from all over the world to pray for peace in Assisi in 1986 and again in 
2002.
38
 
The notions of ecumenism and interreligious dialogue advocated by John Paul II have 
been seriously reviewed by his successor, Benedict XVI. It is known that the German pope, 
who under John Paul II had served as head of the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith, 
looked on with scepticism at events such that of Assisi, since they would give “the false im-
pression that all religions are equally valid.”39 This theological view, according to Benedict 
XVI, has contributed to aggravate “the most profound difficulty of our day”: the spread of 
moral relativism, particularly in a Europe dominated by secularism which seems to have for-
gotten its Christian roots.
40
 For Allan Stoekl, Ratzinger’s approach to interreligious dialogue 
should be interpreted as the attempt to recover the original spirit of the Second Vatican Coun-
cil, yet with a change of strategy. The Second Vatican Council “affirmed ecumenism because 
the hope of de-secularizing society seemed a lost cause,” and thus considered it as a means 
“to further missionary activity” in an irredeemably secular context.41 However, particularly 
with John Paul II, ecumenism appeared to have become an end in itself, with the “reconfigu-
ration of the Church as a tolerant, open organization that recognises the validity of all other 
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religions.”42 Benedict XVI seems determined to return to the idea of ecumenism as a purely 
instrumental, ancillary dimension of the preservation and the assertion of Christianity as the 
only pathway to full truth and salvation.
43
 Rampant secularism needs thus to be challenged, 
not accommodated. Drawing on Arnold Toynbee’s theory of civilisations, and in particular on 
the idea that (a) the Western world is experiencing a crisis due to secularism in the form of 
“the abandonment of religion for the cult of technology, nationalism and militarism” and (b) 
“the fate of a society always depends on its creative minorities,” Ratzinger has recently ar-
gued that the destiny of Europe depends on Christians, who should conceive of themselves as 
such a creative minority. They should help Europe to recover its heritage so as to place it at 
the service of the whole of humanity.
44
 
The reference to Toynbee is a particularly interesting key through which to examine 
the meaning of Benedict’s words. As Robert Irwin points out, “[o]ne particular literary image 
which had a diffuse yet unmistakable impact on Toynbee’s thinking is […] that of the Asiatic 
barbarian horde, conceived of as simultaneously the destroyer and the potential renewal of 
Western civilization.”45 Ratzinger seems to fully embrace this view. Europe’s identity is fun-
damentally Christian, even though Europe, unlike the United States, is against its history and 
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almost denies the public dimension of Christian values.
46
 Islam, on the contrary, is on the rise 
“because of people’s conviction that [it] can provide a valid spiritual foundation to their lives. 
Such a foundation seems to have eluded old Europe, which, despite its enduring political and 
economic power, seems to be on the road to decline and fall.”47 According to Benedict XVI, 
if Europe wants to survive it has to rediscover its Christian roots and affirm its unique (and 
superior?) character, which rests on a unique blend of faith and reason, particularly in the face 
of a rising Islam. One could catch, in these words, a glimpse of Bernard Lewis’ argument that, 
were things to remain as they are, Europe may turn into a Muslim land by the end of the cen-
tury. Hence, in Ratzinger’s account Islam appears at once a threat and an opportunity for the 
moral rebirth for Europe.  
Following Bax’s perspective, it is possible to argue that Benedict’s theology is (also) 
responding to a central worldly European angst about identity (and Islam), one which has al-
ready emerged in a number of occasions, from the debate on whether the European constitu-
tion should contain reference to the ‘Judeo-Christian roots’ of Europe, to the ‘cultural’ ques-
tion over a possible Turkish enlargement, to the issue of Muslim immigrant integration. To 
explore a possible source of this anxiety it is worth considering how Europe has generally ad-
dressed these issues.  
This argument demands drawing a heuristic distinction between Europe conceived as a 
civilisational identity (constructed around historical signifiers such as the Renaissance, the 
Enlightenment, and Christianity), and Europe as an instrumental or procedural project. Both 
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perspectives aim at providing peace, stability, and security by spreading the values of human 
rights, democracy, tolerance, and the rule of law. However, whereas Europe as a civilisational 
identity considers these values as expression of a well-defined (Judeo-Christian) tradition, Eu-
rope as an instrumental project purges these values of their civilisational belonging. By claim-
ing to preserve an organic link between present values and a shared past, the first perspective 
privileges the growing quest for a common centre of identification which may bestow legiti-
macy and social cohesion on the European project; by softening the link between present val-
ues and an allegedly shared past, the second account sacrifices the institution of a common 
centre of gravity in order to avoid dimensions of exclusion based on claims of cultur-
al/civilisational appropriation. To avoid misunderstandings, these categories are not theories 
of the European polity,
48
 but rather dominant discourses within conceptualisations of Europe, 
variously embraced by different social actors both within the worldly and religious regimes. 
Overall, however, it can be argued that the worldly regime of Europe has seemingly 
privileged an instrumental/procedural understanding of Europe with the avowed ambition of 
securing greater room for diversity. Hence, the EU has decided not to include any reference to 
the Christian roots of Europe, but only a general mention of its religious heritage; the official 
approach to enlargement is claimed to be based on universally valid principles
49
 (which make 
appear the debate on whether or not Turkey ‘belongs’ to Europe a cultural speculation with 
limited political relevance); and finally, the issue of Muslim integration has often been con-
ceived as a matter of mutual tolerance and Muslim compliance with the norm of European 
secularity. This rule-based, procedural approach pursued by the worldly regime of Europe—
which opposes the civilisational perspective endorsed by the Catholic Church—stems from 
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the European historical experience. It is the attempt to deflate those sources of communal 
identification that in the past have engendered fragmentation and conflict.  
The problem of this approach, however, is that it is unable to account for the multifac-
eted emotional layers that shape communal dimensions. In “dredg[ing] out of public life as 
much cultural density and depth as possible so that the muddy […] ‘religious’, [and cultural] 
differences don’t flow into the pure water of public reason, procedure and justice,”50 proce-
duralism overlooks the resilience of communal attachment and collective identifications. The-
se dimensions become intercepted by conservative forces, as that represented by Benedict 
XVI, that fill the seemingly apolitical stance of European proceduralism, offering an answer 
for the insecurity that stems from an apparent lack of leadership and political direction. This 
argument, however, does not suggest that proceduralism may lead to a possible ‘re-
evangelisation’ of Europe. As it has been pointed out by Danièle Hervieu-Legér, “the signifi-
cance of referring to the European religious bedrock in terms of heritage,” a term frequently 
used by both John Paul II and Benedict XVI, is possible “only because [religion] is kept dis-
tinct from and operates separately from the places where the rules of collective life are pri-
marily decided. The classification of religion as heritage is supported inexorably by the ero-
sion of the organisational power of religion in social life.”51 
This erosion can be observed in the fact that for Benedict XVI the ‘Otherness’ of Is-
lam does not simply stem from it being an alternative to traditional Christian teachings, but 
resides in the very absence of those elements, grown out of the Enlightenment, which account 
for modern and independent reason (and that the pope considers a specific Christian heritage). 
In evoking a tension between reason and Islam (whose subjects appears uncritically prone to 
submit to the will of a capricious God), the pope is drawing on a secular tradition of Oriental-
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ism which denies to Islam the “search for a hidden truth” and thus “the capability of engaging 
in a process of subjectivity-formation.”52 Benedict XVI’s critique of Islam, in other words, 
resonates with dominant western—and for this very reason, also partially secularised—
discourses in which Muslims are portrayed “as moved by passionate, pre-modern, non-
rational feelings.”53 This view partially draws on a tradition of thought that, ranging from 
Max Weber to Norbert Elias, identifies the specificity and uniqueness of Western European 
modernity in “the regularization and rationalization of one’s entire conduct of life, both body 
and mind […] [which] renders individuals autonomous and isolated at the same time, resistant 
to any merely external forms of domination but closed into the iron cage of a type of subjec-
tivity formation that seems impossible to escape.”54 
Benedict XVI celebrates the unique synthesis of faith and reason of the Christian sub-
ject, but, at the same time, denounces how this synthesis has increasingly displayed an un-
healthy bias towards the latter, leading subjectivity to turn into an ‘iron cage.’ To restore an 
original equilibrium, the German pope champions a shift from a secularly-dominated regime 
in which religion “is placed under the guardianship of reason and carefully contained” to a 
post-secular phase in which “religion and reason […] limit each other mutually, with each 
showing the other its respective limitations, while also pointing the other in the right direc-
tion.”55 This process, however, neither aims to overturn the assumption of a European speci-
ficity, nor to make it irrelevant in cross-cultural relations. Rather, European specificity needs 
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to be strengthened, as it is the only barrier against an unconditioned opening towards other 
cultures that, as Ratzinger sees it, can lead to dangerous forms of moral relativism.  
Interestingly, the nominal proceduralism of Europe that has made political room for 
Benedict’s stances also vindicates a European exceptionalism. In this case, however, the ex-
ceptional nature of Europe rests on its being the only polity that, guided exclusively by the 
universal principles of reason and rationality, can transcend the divisiveness engendered by 
primordial elements such as ethnicity, nationality, or religion. This belief is the second, cru-
cial, limitation of proceduralism. It rests on a selective reconstruction of the past that oblite-
rates events in which elements of alleged civilisational commonality and historical affinity 
have been given priority over universal, rule-based, principles. This belief, however, is deci-
sive for endowing Europe with a higher moral authority—an authority that allows Europe to 
place the burden of exclusion automatically on the excluded without questioning its own as-
sumptions and behaviours.  
In this respect, it can be useful to consider two important moments in the definition of 
the idea of Europe: its birth and the 2004 enlargement. It will be shown how a reading of the-
se events solely through the grand-narratives of ‘integration’ and ‘inclusion’56 does not simply 
overlook the role of interests and political calculations, but neglects important dimensions of 
conceptual and physical exclusion postulated upon a deeply entrenched social imaginary of 
Europe as a moral geography whose boundaries are not simply rule-based, but draw on a 
blend of cultural, religious and civilisational dimensions.  
 
2. Procedural Europe 
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In a 1992 article, “The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe,” Tony 
Judt powerfully argues that for the peoples of Europe the process of European integration has 
served the purpose of obliterating the shameful memories of collaboration with the Nazi re-
gime and of other violence carried out in the name of nationalist ideologies. As he recalls: 
 
Woodrow Wilson and the Treaties of Versailles notwithstanding, the 60 million peo-
ple living under an “alien” jurisdiction in 1914 had not all achieved self-determination 
after World War I: there were still some 25 million persons living in “someone else’s 
state.” The Nazi occupation had gone some way to resolving this perennial European 
problem by killing most of the Jews and some of the smallest stateless groups [Roma 
among others]. After the war, the liberated states took the occasion to further this pro-
cess by removing the Germans themselves. […] Others felt free to indulge in further 
exercises of ethnic purification.
57
 
 
According to Judt, the “further exercises of ethnic purification” were made possible by the 
oblivion which characterised the years immediately after World War II.
58
 The rushing desire 
to overcome these tragic memories by fostering a ‘Euro-cant’ of peace, stability and unity was 
built upon a politics of responsibility which made Germany the supreme and almost only cul-
pable for the tragedies of World War II. This ‘myth’ ignored the crucial fact that: 
 
The Nazis could certainly never have sustained their hegemony over most of the con-
tinent as long as they did […] [had not] most of occupied Europe either collaborated 
with the occupying forces (a minority) or accepted with resignation and equanimity 
the presence and activities of the German forces (a majority).
59
  
 
For Judt, the unwillingness of European nations to recognise their responsibilities in the Nazi 
regime and the adoption of the status of victims of external ferocity was partly necessary to 
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restore a minimum of social cohesion and trust in a social fabric already undermined by totali-
tarian regime and total war.
60
 However, this rebirth of Europe came at a heavy price. It en-
tailed the emergence of ‘two moral vocabularies’ which draw a sharp distinction—a hypocrit-
ical incommensurability—between “what the Germans have done to us” and “what we are do-
ing to others.” Accordingly, this double moral standard not only allowed the expulsion and 
killing of about 15 million Germans and other ethnic minorities from the Balkans and Eastern 
European countries.
61
 It also favoured a certain resilience of anti-Semitism in countries like 
Poland, France, or Austria where, for instance, in the aftermath of World War II, Jews were 
tacitly considered in the general category of those who had been persecuted by the Nazi re-
gime and thus put on a par with the persecuted nationals of these countries. This in turn 
cleared these nations from any charges of cooperation with the Nazi regime in persecuting 
Jews.
62
  
More generally, this double moral vocabulary allowed Europe to purge itself of its re-
sponsibilities without undergoing a serious reflection on both its anti-Semitic and nationalistic 
tendencies. This sanitising process has been vigorously undertaken through the process of Eu-
ropean integration which has promoted an idea of Europe as a space of peace, democracy, and 
solidarity. However, undigested memories from a past that Europe had tried frantically to 
suppress have started to make their comeback: this is how Judt interprets the electoral success 
of the nationalistic and xenophobic far right in Europe, from Jean-Marie Le Pen to Jörg 
Haider, at the beginning of the 1990s. However, there is more than that.  
For Judt, writing in 1992, the legacy of these memories not only casts a shadow on the 
cohesion of the then EU 15, but also on the very possibility of enlargement to the then coun-
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tries of Eastern Europe. He suggested that the idea of Europe—and the related process of Eu-
ropean integration—was also possible because of “the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe.” It “had 
the double virtue of keeping the region away from the prosperous West, while at the same 
time allowing the latter the luxury of lamenting the very circumstances from which it was 
benefiting.”63 Western Europe—the European Union—felt little responsibility to actively 
campaign to tear down this divide. Judt recalls the support of the western left for the com-
munist regimes and how some of its exponents described the Perestroika as a missed oppor-
tunity for the renewal of the communist project; or the “lack of enthusiasm displayed by 
French and other statesman at the fall of the Wall and its consequences.”64 Judt concludes by 
arguing that the idea of Europe as institutionalised in the process of European integration has 
been built on “historical sands.”65 It has been based on a myth of solidarity and cohesion 
which hides the powerful nationalistic tendencies which haunted the EU 15 and which ob-
scured the divide between Western and Eastern Europe, casting shadows on the possibility of 
a future European enlargement.  
Two elements of Judt’s account are particularly relevant for our purposes: firstly, the 
idea that a united Europe is a project born out of the necessity of obliterating the memories of 
violence of World War II; secondly, the fact that this very genesis, the obliteration of 
memory, leaves this project “built on sand” and thus casts a shadow on its future develop-
ments, particularly the possibility of an eastern enlargement. These arguments raise two im-
portant sets of questions: firstly, what are the implications of conceiving the European project 
as one born out of the attempt to overcome past memories of violence, and thus not moved 
primarily by elements of communal identification? Secondly, how can we interpret the fact 
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that an enlargement that in 1992 appeared deeply problematic was, slightly more than ten 
years later, a political reality?  
The creation of a community among entities that had been fighting each other for cen-
turies suggests a universal project—a project based not on shared blood, ethnicity, or religion, 
but on a universal aim, peace, and universal principles, such as democracy, justice, and toler-
ance. This universal narrative, which, in slightly different guises, accounts for one of the most 
revered meanings of the idea of a united Europe and is one of the pillars of its procedural self-
understanding, is nonetheless postulated upon an implicit exclusion. Taking Judt’s argument 
as reflective of a more generalised European understanding, Talal Asad observes how the 
suppressed memories of violence on which the project of Europe has been built do not include 
“violence perpetrated in this period [World War II and its aftermath] by Europeans outside 
Europe—in colonial Africa, say, or in the Middle East. No mention is even made of Algeria, 
which was, after all, an internal department of France.”66 What Asad is suggesting is that the 
memory of past violence on which the narrative of Europe has been built does not include all 
forms of violence committed by Europeans, but only those specifically committed on Euro-
peans within a European geographical space. This self-referential culpability for past violence 
which does not take into account violence committed onto those beyond the space of Europe, 
has important implications for “how the conceptual boundaries of moral and legal solidarity 
are actually traced.”67 
The memories of injustices committed in Europe, albeit fragmented and partially dis-
torted, are the selective memories mentioned by Hervieu-Léger in our introduction: memories 
that mould contemporary dimensions of European being and solidarity and contribute to 
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shape a shared European worldview, but that obliterate another history of European violence, 
linked to the process of decolonisation. According to Peo Hansen, “the most canonized frame 
of reference in the literature on integration theory and the historical evolution of today’s Eu-
ropean Union” usually includes four elements, two internal—the devastation of two world 
wars and the nationalist rivalries in Europe—and two external—the role of the United States 
and the Cold War.
68
 It is a strange omission, he continues, that this framework does not take 
into account post-colonialism since “the early stages of European integration would also coin-
cide with the dismantling of another world order.”69 This omission, he suggests, is not fortui-
tous but is related to the “European Union’s own conception of its historical trajectory and 
[…] how the EU employs these conceptions of history in its current endeavour to foster and 
disseminate a sense of ‘European identity’ in the Union.”70 Hansen’s main contention is that 
the notion of European identity as based on peace, human rights, solidarity, and widening cir-
cles of identification, is postulated upon the exclusion of a whole series of “atrocities, wars 
and structures of exploitation” directly linked to colonialism and decolonisation.71 
Thus, he states, the idea that European integration has guaranteed the absence of wars 
in Europe can only be defended if one rules out the wars fought by European countries in 
their colonial possessions. Among them stands out the 1956 Suez War and, most of all, the 
Algerian War (1954–1962). The latter is particularly relevant not only because it engaged 
400,000 French troops and killed hundreds of thousands, but because Algeria was constitu-
tionally an integral part of France, and thus it was part of the then European Community. This 
example, Hansen contends, is particularly illuminating because “even a sizeable war fought 
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inside the Community has not been able to impinge on the notion of European integration as a 
symbol of peace, and that its promotion of a European identity has served as an antidote to 
war.”72  
What this case seems to suggest is the existence of a space of Europe and a space out-
side Europe to which Algeria fighting for independence belonged—despite formally being a 
part of Europe—and therefore somehow morally less relevant to the shaping of European 
sense of identity. This argument not only sustains Talal Asad’s argument of the existence of 
two moral spaces, but also suggests that the very selective memories that feed the narrative of 
the European Union are not procedurally mobilised in a universal environment, but confront 
the existence of an already qualified moral geography whose boundaries have their roots in 
supposed civilisational or religious commonalities.    
This moral geography, the existence of a transcendent idea of Europe, should not be 
exaggerated in its capacity of moulding feelings of identification and solidarity. A number of 
factors, including political realism and economic calculations, contribute to shape political 
processes and build communities. What is merely claimed here is that the idea of a procedural 
Europe shaped by universal narratives, as that of a strongly sought peace which could bring to 
an end the long history of European violence, is possible only if a communal vision is upheld, 
one which deems certain manifestations of European violence, as those perpetrated “in colo-
nial Africa […] or in the Middle East,” less compelling or relevant, in any case different, and 
therefore exclude them from Europe’s universal history. 
The encroachment of universalist rhetoric, civilisational visions, and political calcula-
tion can be interestingly observed in another important moment of the definition of the idea of 
Europe, the 2004 enlargement. Again, Judt’s argument offers an interesting platform for dis-
cussion. The obliteration of memory of violence which makes the bedrock of the European 
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project, Judt argued, will probably constitute a hindrance against the possibility of an eastern 
enlargement since these nations will not easily forget having been ‘abandoned.’ However, 
with the 2004 enlargement eight countries of Central and Eastern Europe have become offi-
cial members of the European Union. This fact should not lead us to automatically discard 
Judt’s conclusion (written in 1992), but rather to consider what has made possible this rap-
prochement in such a short period of time.  
According to Helene Sjursen, although “[t]he EU claims that the rules that govern the 
enlargement process are not just ‘specially preferred’, but rely on universally valid princi-
ples,”73 it is not merely the compliance of Eastern European countries with such principles, if 
at all, that has made enlargement possible. She highlights how, from the mid-1990s, Western 
European rhetoric towards Eastern Europe has increasingly emphasised a shared identity and 
past and thus the necessity of helping these countries in their transition. This duty, Sjursen 
remarks, is expression of “a long term commitment […] a sense of particular responsibility 
towards Eastern Europe”74 stemming also from the traumatic division that took place at Yalta. 
This argument suggests that the perspective adopted by Judt to account for the birth of the Eu-
ropean Union could also be employed to explain some dimensions of the decision to enlarge. 
Whereas the European Union allowed several European countries to veil their violent past 
made of collaboration with the Nazi regime and nationalistic excesses, enlargement to eastern 
countries has allowed Western Europe to lay a veil over “the image of the west abandoning 
Eastern Europe at the end of the second world war […] [on the betrayed] expectation that they 
ought to do something and the moral outrage when they did not.” This idea, Sjursen main-
tains, “has remained powerful and colours both east European perception of western policies 
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and the west’s own policies and role conception.”75 For Sjursen, however, the eastern en-
largement can neither be reduced to a matter of historical guilt, nor of procedural implementa-
tion of liberal norms, but encompasses the existence of a deeper “community-based identi-
ty.”76  
It is in the name of this common European identity that, “in the process of supporting 
applicant states in their efforts to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria,” the EU has channelled much 
more financial resources to Poland (incidentally the country whose European identity was 
more forcefully advocated by John Paul II) than Turkey.
77
 Moreover, had it been just a ques-
tion of procedural compliance with the rules of acquis communautaire, Poland’s membership 
in the EU should have been delayed.
78
 According to Bahar Rumelili, the different treatment 
reserved to Poland and Turkey can be better grasped by drawing a heuristic distinction be-
tween “acquired” and “inherent differences.”79 Poland and other eastern countries are deemed 
to share the same civilisational pattern of Western Europe. This pattern has diverged under 
the communist dictatorships, with the result that these countries have ‘acquired’ differences. 
These differences, however, can be ‘eliminated’ as long as Western Europe supports these 
countries in their process of transition. The same argument cannot be made in the case of 
Turkey, for which a dimension of ‘inherent’ difference (‘civilisational,’ in the terms of this 
paper) sheds an aura of doubt on whether, European efforts notwithstanding, this country can 
really become part of Europe.   
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These arguments alone would probably be sufficient to support the claim that Europe, 
while vindicating a universal proceduralism (that endows it with a moral higher ground 
whereby it can place the burden of exclusion automatically on the excluded), practises a 
communalistic politics of exclusion. There is, however, another aspect of this logic of “exter-
nalisation of difference”80 pursued by Europe, namely its self-enforcing character. In order to 
grasp this dimension it is necessary to consider how Western European attitudes towards 
Eastern Europe, despite claims of “community-based identity,” have been anything but even. 
The enlargement policy, Paul Blokker remarks, has been predominantly based on a spirit of 
assimilation and therefore “some [Eastern European] countries have been favoured from the 
start on the basis of their alleged [cultural] vicinity to Europe.”81 This approach has pushed 
applicant states not simply to emphasise their historical and civilisational Europeanness, but 
also to stigmatise the non-European nature of competing neighbouring states.
82
 The “making 
of Central Europe” (which would include countries such as Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslo-
vakia) as a historical/geographical space distinct from Eastern Europe (ranging from Ukraine 
to the Balkans, but also including Romania and Slovakia), whose Europeaness has been heav-
ily questioned by the neighbouring countries of Central Europe due to their Russian and ‘Ori-
ental’ influences, is a paradigmatic example of how embracing the logic of externalisation of 
difference appears as a necessary requirement to be part of the European Union
83
 (albeit one 
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not codified in its rule-based approach). As Iver B. Neumann insightfully argues, “one reason 
applicant members [have] avail[ed] themselves of an exclusionary rhetoric is that it sits well 
with a certain exclusionary strand of overall European discourse.”84  
The self-enforcing auto-referentiality that seems to characterise the process of Europe-
an integration, based on the replication of a non-negotiable and non-questionable Western Eu-
ropean core, raises doubts on the transformative potential enacted by the project of enlarge-
ment, particularly on the possibility of a cosmopolitan Europe capable of embracing diversity. 
Hence, European nominal proceduralism, disregarded in practice, appears also deeply prob-
lematic as a normative aspiration. Its blanket of rules prevents the self-reflection that should 
accompany every encounter with what or who is deemed ‘different’ and, at the same time, 
leaves a sense of anxiety on values and identities that this blanket should shelter. Procedural-
ism, expanding on Wendy Brown’s argument, can neither provide substantive answers, nor 
interpret Europe’s thorniest questions of identity, difference, and boundaries.  
Proceduralism externalises Turkish (Muslim) Otherness, making it a matter of ‘inher-
ent difference’ that preserves as much as possible a social imaginary of universal principles 
that have definitively transcended blood, nation, and religion, and leaves to formally non-
political actors, as Benedict XVI, the role of voicing fears and prejudice against Islam. Within 
this framework, the “paradox” of a secular Europe whose “boundaries are becoming more 
sharply defined in religious [Christian] terms”85 remains a paradox only as long as we take the 
pope and his addresses as relevant for the faithful and the theologians. This perspective, how-
ever, is problematic. As has been argued, that of Benedict, is a fully fledged political position 
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generated (and strengthened) by the inconsistencies of European nominal proceduralism. Poli-
tics overflows the realm of the secular (after all, a very recent invention) and therefore it 
would be a mistake to ignore this voice by branding it simply as ‘religious.’ This voice (cer-
tainly not the only one) signals an uneasiness: the fact that the question of European identity 
is a political question and as a political question it has to be dealt with. 
3. Conclusion 
Is it possible to treat the question of European identity ‘politically,’ that is to say, valorising 
national and religious attachment without turning this appreciation into the very exclusionary 
dimension that an impossible proceduralism wants to avoid? Maybe not, but what this essay 
has tried to argue is that this is probably a better starting point for a more open and pluralist 
Europe than the arrogant proceduralism of a European polity which hides its emotions and 
fears behind the veil of technical rules. The ‘political minimalism’ endorsed by Europe ap-
pears counterproductive, if not altogether detrimental. As William Connolly has suggested, in 
highly differentiated polities “spaces in which differences may constitute themselves as con-
tending identities are […] most effectively established by political means.”86 The call for a 
politicisation of the question of identity does not mean that Europe should anchor its self-
understanding to a single dimension or a blend of them (Christianity, secularity, nationality, 
ethnicity) and then shape its policies accordingly. Quite the opposite, it means recognising 
that all these aspects that make the character of Europe and their related exclusionary tenden-
cies cannot be contained and transcended through a set of procedural norms. It means recog-
nising, in other words, that ‘European’ identities are not exceptional: they are emotional for-
mations that articulate solidarities and exclusions like all ‘other’ identities.  
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If this is the case, how is it possible to reconcile Europe’s universal and exceptional 
narrative of reconciliation after violence and unity after fragmentation with an identity still 
admittedly particularistic, as witnessed by its difficult relation with Islam,
87
 be it within (Mus-
lim minorities) or at its gates (Turkey)? At the beginning of this discussion, quoting Etienne 
Balibar, it was argued that European proceduralism is the attempt to shape “a new civiliza-
tional pattern […] by rearranging the elements inherited from the very institutions it has to 
overcome.” For Balibar, however, this project does not necessarily demand proceduralism. 
On the contrary, he claims, it is possible to “explore the possibilities for Europe to use its own 
fragilities and indeterminacies […] as an effective mediation in the process of bringing about 
a new political culture, a new pattern of politics.”88 Europe could then be conceived as a “van-
ishing mediator,” a transformative bridge between past and present whose ‘exceptional char-
acter’ would reside, also in consideration of its history, in being a ‘space of translation’ be-
tween different cultures.
89
 Translation as the only genuine “idiom of Europe” (Balibar bor-
rows the image from Umberto Eco) would demand looking for universals, but also acknowl-
edging the existence of “non-translatable ideas and forms.”90  
This image, powerful as a literary figure, appears more elusive in terms of political 
implementation. Whatever the hurdles though, this project deserves every effort. The brief 
exploration of Papal diplomacy with regards to Europe has in fact suggested a correspondence 
between events in the religious regime and the worldly regime. Thus, whereas the religious 
regime moved from the logic of the blocs of Pius XII, to the proactive ‘inclusiveness’ of John 
Paul II via the Ostpolitik of Paul VI, the worldly regime of Europe was undertaking a process 
of “cosmopolitan Europeanization” expanding “its territorial borders through the integration 
                                                 
87
 Difficulties, to be sure, to which Muslim themselves have contributed.   
88
 Balibar, “Europe,” 334. 
89
 Ibid. 
90
 Balibar, “Europe,” 335. 
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of the external periphery into an internally homogeneous space.”91 Benedict XVI’s conserva-
tive and exclusionary stances, however, matched by the increasing difficulties of European 
societies to integrate their Muslim minorities, appears to be an indication of the limits reached 
by a cosmopolitan model of territorial enlargement which may not have been as successful in 
“enlarging the European mind.”92 Hence the necessity of rethinking Europe as a complex 
space of translation appears all the more urgent, because, as remarked by Talal Asad,  
 
[i]f Europe cannot be articulated in terms of complex space and complex time that al-
low for multiple ways of life (and not merely multiple identities) to flourish, it may be 
fated to be no more than the common market of an imperial civilization, always anx-
ious about (Muslim) exiles within its gates and (Muslim) barbarians beyond.
93
  
 
The barbarians awaited and feared by Toynbee and Benedict XVI. 
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